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THE APEX AND HUTCHESON CASES
THE APEX AND HUTCHESON CASES
By HELEN CAREY*
T HE recent Supreme Court decisions in Apex Hosiery Co. v.
Leader' and United States v. Hutcheson2 have again focused
public attention on the cases dealing with labor under the anti-
trust laws. Before an attempt can be made to analyze the effect
of these two cases upon the existing law, a review of the prior
legal development on the point is necessary.
I. THE ANTI-TRusT LAWS
Although it appears clear that the dominant purpose of Con-
gress in enacting the Sherman Anti-Trust Law3 was the regula-
tion of monopolistic business enterprises, 4 the language found in
sec. 1 of the law, that "Every contract, combination in the form
of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or com-
merce among the several states, or with foreign nations, is de-
clared to be illegal" is amenable to an interpretation which would
include labor combinations within the scope of the Act. This
interpretation was early made. The most famous, or infamous,
depending upon the point'of view, of these early decisions was
*Senior law student, University of Minnesota Law School; member
Loard of student editors, Minnesota Law Review, 1938-1940.
1(1940) 310 U. S. 469, 60 Sup. Ct. 982, 84 L. Ed. 1311, 128 A. L. R.
1044 and note. The Apex litigation is discussed in Gregory, Labor's
Coercive Activities under the Sherman Act-The Apex Case, (1940) 7
U. Chi. L. Rev. 347; Cohen and Gerber, Organized Labor or the Sherman
Act, (1939) 2 Nat'l Lawyers' Guild Q. 103; Landis, The Apex Case, (1940)
8 I. C. C. Pract. J. 24; Steffen, Labor Activities in Restraint of Trade: The
Apex Case, (1941) 50 Yale L. J. 787; Gregory, The Sherman Act v. Labor,
(1941) 8 U. Chi. L. Rev. 222; Cavers, Labor v. The Sherman Act, (1941)
8 U. Chi. L. Rev. 246; Landis, The Apex Case, (1941) 26 Corn. L. Q. 191;
Brown, The Apex Case and Its Effect Upon Labor Activities and The Anti-
Trust Laws, (1941) 21 Boston U. L. Rev. 48; (1939) 39 Col. L. Rev.
1247; (1940) 54 Harv. L. Rev. 146; (1940) 29 Geo. L. J. 120; (1940)
35 Ill. L. Rev. 424; (1941) 39 Mich. L. Rev. 462; (1940) 26 Va. L. Rev.
518; (1937) 15 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rev. 135; (1937) 51 Harv. L. Rev. 169.
-(1941) 61 Sup. Ct. 463, discussed in Landis, The Apex Case, (1941)
26 Corn. L. Q. 191, 212A; Steffen, Labor Activities in Restraint of Trade:
The Apex 'Case, (1941) 50 Yale L. J. 787, 812; (1941) 54 Harv. L.
Rev. 887.
31 Mason's U. S. Code, tit. 15, secs. 1-7, 15 U. S. C. A. secs. 1-7, 4
F. C. A. tit. 15, secs. 1-7.
4Boudin, The Sherman Act and Labor Disputes: I, (1939) 39 Col. L.
Rev. 1283; Shulman, Labor and the Anti-Trust Laws, (1940) 34 Ill. L.
Rev. 769, 770, 787; Cohen and Gerber, Organized Labor or the Sherman
Act, (1939) 2 Nat'l Lawyers' Guild Q. 103, 104.
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Loewe v. Lawlor." This was an action for triple damages under
the Sherman Act brought by an employer against a labor union
which not only had gone on strike, but also had boycotted plain-
tiff's hats in the hands of dealers in states other than the state of
manufacture. In finding a cause of action under the Sherman Act, the
Supreme Court stated that there was a combination falling within
the class of restraints of trade aimed at compelling third parties
and strangers involuntarily not to engage in the course of trade
except upon conditions that the combination imposed.
This decision aroused a storm of protest from labor that led
to agitation for congressional action to free labor from the incubus
of the Sherman Act. The product of labor's crusade was the
Clayton Act, sec. 66 of which declared that:
"The labor of a human being is not a ccmmod'ty or article
of commerce. Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be
construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor . . .
organizations . ..or to forbid or restrain individual members of
such organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate
objects thereof; nor shall such organizations, or the members
thereof, be held or construed to be illegal combinations or con-
spiracies in restraint of trade, under the antitrust laws."
Section 217 provided:
"That no 'estraining order or injunction shall be granted by
any. court of the United States ...in any case between an em-
ployer and employees, or between employers and employees, or
between employees, or between persons employed and persons
seeking employment, involving, or growing out of a dispute con-
cerning terms or conditions of employment .... "
went on to list certain acts which shall not be enjoined,8 and con-
5(1908) 208 U. S. 274, 28 Sup. Ct. 301, 52 L. Ed. 488, 13 Ann. Cas. 815.
Shulman, Labor and Anti-Trust Laws, (1940) 34 Ill. L. Rev. 769, 770, says
that the whole structure of labor cases under the anti-trust laws is an
inverted pyramid resting on the holding in this case, in spite of the fact
that even here the issue was little considered.
61 Mason's U. S. Code, tit. 15, sec. 17, 15 U. S. C. A., sec. 17, 4
F. C. A., tit. 15, sec. 17.
72 Mason's U. S. Code, tit. 29, sec. 52, 29 U. S. C. A., sec. 52, 9
F. C. A., tit. 29, sec. 52.
sNo person or persons, singly or in concert shall be enjoined" ... from
terminating any relation of employment, or from ceasing to perform any
work or labor, or from recommending, advising, or persuading others by
peaceful means so to do; or from attending at any place where any such
person or persons may lawfully be, for the purpose of peacefully obtaining
or communicating information, or from peacefully persuading any person
to work or to abstain from working; or from ceasing to patronize or to
employ any party to such dispute, or from recommending, advising, or
persuading others by peaceful and lawful means so to do; or from paying
or giving to, or withholding from, any person engaged in such dispute, any
strike benefits or other moneys or things of value; or from peaceably as-
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cluded "nor shall any of the acts specified in this paragraph be
considered or held to be violations of any law of the United States."
Labor's jubilation over the passage of its "Magna Charta" was
cut short, however, by the decisions construing the Act, which
severely limited the scope of its promised effectiveness in freeing
labor from the Sherman Law. The starting point of this con-
struction was that the Clayton Act does not have the effect of
legalizing any act which was previously unlawful,9 that the pro-
visions of section 20 are " . . . merely declaratory of what was
the best practice always."110 After the judicial process of con-
struction was completed, it had been determined that the Clayton
Act precluded injunctions only in the immediate employer-
employee relationship;11 that union interference with existing
contractual relationships might still be enjoined ;12 that labor
could not combine with capital to boycott non-union products
from another state,13 nor could it alone refuse to work on non-
union products which had been manufactured out of state, 4 and
still claim the protection of the Clayton Act.
sembling in a lawful manner, and for lawful purposes; or from doing any
act or thing which might lawfully be done in the absence of such dispute
by any party thereto; ... "
9Kroger Groc. & Bak. Co. v. Retail Clerks' I. P. Ass'n, (E.D. Mo.
1918) 250 Fed. 890.lOAmerican Steel Found. v. Tri-City Council, (1921) 257 U. S. 184,
203, 42 Sup. Ct. 72, 66 L. Ed. 189.11Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, (1921) 254 U. S. 443, 41 Sup.
Ct. 172, 65 L. Ed. 349, 16 A. L. R. 196; Buyer v. Guillan, (C.C.A. 2d Cir.
1921) 271 Fed. 65, 16 A. L. R. 216; Waitresses' Union v. Benish Restaurant
Co., (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1925) 6 F. (2d) 568; see American Steel Found. v.
Tri-City Council, (1921) 257 U. S. 184, 202, 42 Sup. Ct. 72, 66 L. Ed. 189,
27 A. L. R. 360. See generally on the matter of limitations placed on the
Clayton Act, Frankfurter and Greene, Congressional Power over the Labor
Injunction, (1931) 31 Col. L. Rev. 385, 404-405; Landis, The Apex Case,
(1940) 8 I. C. C. Pract. J. 24, 29.12 Kinloch Tel. Co. v. Local Union No. 2, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1921) 275
Fed. 241, cert. denied (1921) 257 U. S. 662, 42 Sup. Ct. 270, 66 L. Ed. 423,
which enjoined a union's inducing a breach of contract by plaintiff's em-
ployees, which contract provided for arbitration before striking; Central
Metal Prod. Corp. v. O'Brien, (N.D. Ohio 1922) 278 Fed. 827, app. dis-
missed (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1922) 284 Fed. 850, (contract between the plaintiff
and itQ c,,tower).
-:United States v. Brims, (1926) 272 U. S. 549, 47 Sup. Ct. 169, 71
L. Ed. 403.
l 4Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Ass'n, (1927)
274 U. S. 37, 47 Sup. Ct. 522, 71 L. Ed. 916, 54 A. L. R. 791, discussed in
Witte, The Journeymen Stonecutters' Decision, (1927) 17 Am. Labor
Legislation Rev. 139, and in Royce, Labor, the Federal Anti-Trust Laws,
And the Supreme Court, (1928) 5 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 19; Duplex Printing
Press Co. v. Deering, (1921) 254 U. S. 443, 41 Sup. Ct. 172, 65 L. Ed. 349,
16 A. L. R. 196; Columbus Heat. & Vent. Co. v. Pittsburgh Bldg. T. C.,(W.D. Pa. 1927) 17 F. (2d) 806. A related situation was presented by
Buyer v. Guillan, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1921) 271 Fed. 65, 16 A. L. R. 216,
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On the other hand, interference through strikes with the
manufacturing or other processing of goods destined for interstate
commerce-designated by the courts as an "indirect" restraint-
is not in violation of the antitrust laws15 unless it is found that the
strikers intended to restrain or control a commodity's supply
moving in interstate commerce, or its price in interstate markets.",
In contrast is the judicial treatment of "direct" restraints on inter-
state commerce, best illustrated in the transportation and commu-
nication cases. Here it is said that if the necessary effect of the
acts involved would be to restrain interstate commerce, the acts
are illegal irrespective of the objectives or purposes of the actors;
in other words, their intent is not relevant.1
7
II. THE NORRIS-LAGUARDIA ACT
Such was the existing situation when the Norris-LaGuardia
Act' became law. This Act, which was based on Congress'
power to regulate the jurisdiction of the congressionally-created
courts, deprived these courts of jurisdiction to issue injunctions
where refusal of union employees of a transportation company to trans-
port plaintiff's non-union made goods was held to be a conspiracy violating
the Sherman Act.
"5United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., (1922) 259 U. S. 344,
42 Sup. Ct. 570, 66 L. Ed. 975; Gable v. Vonnegut Mach. Co., (C.C.A. 6th
Cir. 1921) 274 Fed. 66; United Leather Workers v. Herkert, (1924) 265
U. S. 457, 44 Sup. Ct. 623, 68 L. Ed. 1104, 33 A. L. R. 566; Landis, The
Apex Case, (1940) 8 I. C. C. Pract. J. 24, 32; Landis, The Apex Case,
(1941) 26 Corn. L. Q. 191, 205; (1933) 32 Mich. L. Rev. 240.
'
6 Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, (1925) 268 U. S.
295, 45 Sup. Ct. 551, 69.L. Ed. 963, (the second Coronado Case) commented
on in (1926) 74 U. Pa. L. Rev. 321, and in (1925) 35 Yale L. J. 111; see
United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., (1922) 259 U. S. 344, 410, 42
Sup. Ct. 570, 66 L. Ed. 975, 27 A. L. R. 762, (the first Coronado Case);
Industrial Ass'n v. United States, (1925) 268 U. S. 64, 77, 45 Sup. Ct. 403, 69
L. Ed. 849, (industrial combination rather than labor). Gregory, Labor's
Coercive Activities Under the Sherman Act-The Apex Case, (1940) 7
U. Chi. L. Rev. 347, 352 expresses the view that in the second Coronado
Case the Supreme Court developed a device permitting all coercive labor
activities designed to achieve immediate ends such as better wages, and for
condemning the same activities when aimed at the spread of union power
through the closed shop in industries serving national markets.
'7Williams v. United States, (C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1923) 295 Fed. 302, cert.
denied (1923) 265 U. S. 591, 44 Sup. Ct. 636, 68 L. Ed. 1195; Western
Union Tel. Co. v. Internat'l B. of E. Workers, (N.D. Ill. 1924) 2 F. (2d)
993, aff'd (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1925) 6 F. (2d) 444, 46 A. L. R. 1538; see
United States v. Railway Employees' Dept., (N.D. Ill. 1922) 283 Fed.
479, 491; Note, (1940) 49 Yale L. J. 518, 520-521.
'SMason's U. S. Code, Perm. Supp. No. 3, tit. 29, secs. 101-115, 29 U. S.
C. A., 1940 Supp., secs. 101-115, 9 F. C. A., tit. 29, secs. 101-115.
The congressional history of this act and a discussion of its provisions
is to be found in Witte, The Federal Anti-Injunction Act, (1932) 16
MINNESOTA LAW REvIEW 638; see, also, (1932) 30 Mich. L. Rev. 1257.
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against the doing of specifically enumerated acts 9 by the par-
ticipants in a labor dispute as defined"0 in the Act. No direct
employer-employee relationship need exist to bring a case within
the ambit of the Norris-LaGuardia Act ;21 it is enough if the
parties are engaged in the same industry2" or have some other
interest in the terms and conditions of employment involved in
the dispute.3 Thus, jurisdictional disputes between unions can
no longer be enjoined by an employer on the ground that none
of the members of one of the unions are in his employ.' 4  Nor
can a union refusal to work on non-union products in the hands
"rMason's U. S. Code, Perm. Supp. No. 4, tit. 29, sec. 104, 29
U. S. C. A. sec. 104, 9 F. C. A. tit. 29, sec. 104.
''Mason's U. S. Code Perm. Supp. No. 4, tit. 29, sec. 113, 29
U. S. C. A., sec. 113, 9 F. C. A., tit. 29, sec. 113.
"1New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., (1938) 303 U. S. 552,
58 Sup. Ct. 703, 82 L. Ed. 1012, commented on in (1938) 86 U. Pa. L. Rev.
784; Diamond F. F. Hosiery Co. v. Leader, (E.D. Pa. 1937) 20 F. Supp.
467, app. dismissed (C.C.A. 3d Cir. 1937) 99 F. (2d) 1001; Cinderella
Theater Co. v. Sign Writers' Local Union, (E.D. Mich. 1934) 6 F. Supp.
164; Dean v. Mayo, (W.D. La. 1934) 8 F. Supp. 73. (1938) 36 Mich. L.
Rev. 1146, 1157, in discussing this case, erroneously says that it repudiated
the prior holdings that conspiracies directly to restrain interstate commerce
could be enjoined. The case held that because a labor dispute existed and
the jurisdictional prerequisites of the Norris-LaGuardia Act were not satis-
fied, the court could not consider the case on its merits. The plaintiff was
granted the injunction in a later case, after complying with the procedural
requirements. (W.D. La. 1934) 9 F. Supp. 459, aff'd (C.C.A. 5th Cir.
1936) 82 F. (2d) 554.
-Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, (1933) 289 U. S. 103, 53 Sup.
Ct. 549, 77 L. Ed. 1062, discussed in Monkemeyer, Five Years of the Norris-
La Guardia Act, (1937) 2 Mo. L. Rev. 1, 12; Diamond F. F. Hosiery Co. v.
Leader, (E.D. Pa. 1937) 20 F. Supp. 467, app. dismissed (C.C.A. 3d Cir.
1937) 99 F. (2d) 1001; Blankenship v. Kurfman, (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1938)
96 F. (2d) 450; Lauf v. E. G. Shinner & Co., (1938) 303 U. S. 323, 58 Sup.
Ct. 578, 82 L. Ed. 872. This case in the appellate court (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1936)
82 F. (2d) 68, is discussed in (1936) 84 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1027; (1936) 21 St.
Louis L. Rev. 350; (1937) 31 I1. L. Rev. 688; Note, (1937) 15 N. Y. U.
L. Q. Rev. 116; and the Supreme Court decision which reversed it is noted
in (1938) 23 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 108; (1938) 86 U. Pa. L. Rev. 784;
(1938) 13 Ind. L. J. 516; (1938) 24 Va. L. Rev. 684. But cf. Fehr Baking
Co. v. Bakers' Union, (W.D. La. 1937) 20 F. Supp. 691.
-'New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Groc. Co., (1938) 303 U. S. 552,
58 Sup. Ct. 703, 82 L. Ed. 1012, commented on in (1938) 86 U. Pa. L. Rev.
784. Here the interest involved was that of a Negro society in the em-
ployment of members of its own race.
On the general question of when a "labor dispute" exists, see, in addi-
tion to the comments cited in footnotes 21 and 22 above, (1936) 84 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 771; (1937) 50 Harv. L. Rev. 1295. (1937) 21 MINNESOTA LAW
REVIEW 467, and (1938) 22 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 271 deal with the
same problem arising under state statutes patterned after the federal act.
-4See Blankenship v. Kurfman, (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1938) 96 F. (2d) 450,
453; but see M. & M. Wood Work Co. v. Plywood & Veneer Workers
Local, (D.D. Or. 1938) 23 F. Supp. 11, 20; United States v. Drivers,
Chauffeurs, etc., Union, (D.C. 1940) 32 F. Supp. 594, 599, 600.
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of customers in order to force unionization of the manufacturer
be enjoined.2
Although the concept of interstate -commerce was broadened
by the decisions 26 under the National Labor Relations Act,27 this
broadened concept has no application under the antitrust laws.2
It was generally believed that the scope of the Norris-La-
Guardia Act -was purely jurisdictional, affecting only the power
of the federal courts to grant injunctions, and that it had no effect
on the substantive law, 29 although a few predictions to the con-
trary were ventured. 0
It was against this background that the Apex 31 and Hutche-
solt 2 decisions were projected.
III. THE APEX AND HUTCHaESON CASES
The Apex Case was an action for triple damages under the
Sherman Act by an employer whose plant, which manufactured
hosiery, 80 per cent of which was sold in interstate commerce,
had been seized by sit-down strikers. The strikers refused to
permit shipment of already-completed hosiery to fill orders in inter-
state commerce. The purpose of the strike was found to be
25Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, (1933) 289 U. S. 103, 53 Sup.
Ct. 549, 77 L. Ed. 1062, discussed in Monkemeyer, Five Years of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, (1937) 2 Mo. L. Rev. 1, 11-12. This case held that the
union acts were to suppress the use of steel, and the use was said to be a
purely local matter. But cf. Fehr Baking Co. v. Bakers' Union, (W.D.
La. 1937) 20 F. Supp. 691.26The leading case is National Labor Relations Board v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., (1937) 301 U. S. 1, 57 Sup. Ct. 615, 81 L. Ed. 893,
108 A. L. R. 1352 and note.27Mason's U. S. Code, Perm. Supp. No. 4, tit. 29, secs. 151-166, 29
U. S. C. A., 1940 Supp., sec. 151-166, 9 F. C. A., tit. 29, secs. 151-166.
2sBlankenship v. Kurfman, (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1938) 96 F. (2d) 450.
See Brown, The Apex Case and Its Effect Upon Labor Activities and the
Anti-Trust Laws, (1941) 21 Boston U. L. Rev. 48, 87-90; Note, (1940)
24 M14NESOTA LAW REVIEW 940, 952-953; (1937) 15 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rev.
135, 136; (1937) 5 U. Chi. L. Rev. 149, 150; (1938) 36 Mich. L. Rev. 844;
(1939) 39 Col. L. Rev. 1247.
29United States v. Drivers, Chauffeurs, etc., Union, (D.C. 1940) 32 F.
Supp. 594; see Cinderella Theater Co. v. Sign Writers' Union, (E.D. Mich.
1934) 6 F. Supp. 164, 168-169; (1932) 30 Mich. L. Rev. 1257, 1269, note
51; Frankfurter and Greene, Congressional Power Over the Labor Injunc-
tion, (1931) 31 Col. L. Rev. 385, 408; Gregory, Labor's Coercive Activities
Under the Sherman Act-The Apex Case, (1940) 7 U. Chi. L. Rev. 347,
356-357; Note (1940) 49 Yale L. J. 518, 529; Cohen and Gerber, Organized
Labor or the Sherman Act, (1939) 2 Nat'l Lawyers' Guild Q. 103.
30(1940) 7 U. Chi. L. Rev. 388, 394; Monkemeyer, Five Years of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, (1937) 2 Mo. L. Rev. 1, 3.
31(1940) 310 U. S. 469, 60 Sup. Ct. 982, 84 L. Ed. 1311, 128 A. L. R.
1044.
32(1941) 61 Sup. Ct. 463.
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to force the unionization of the Apex plant. The case was held
not within the Sherman Act, the court interpreting that Act to
prohibit conspiracies to obstruct interstate transportation only
when in purpose or effect they will or do result in a form of
market control of a commodity such as to monopolize the supply,
control its price, or discriminate between its would-be purchasers.
In the flood of comment generated by the Apex Case, the
proposition expressed in the majority opinion, that the market con-
trol test is not novel in labor cases but was the real basis for the
decisions in the Lowe, Duplex, and Bedford Cases, meets with
some approval 3 It is submitted, however, that while market
control may have been involved in the fact situations of these
cases, the decisions were not placed on this ground.
Another notion seemingly implicit in the Apex Case is that
whether or not the Sherman Act applies in a given situation is a
matter of statutory construction rather than a question of whether
the activity restrains interstate commerce as that concept is limited
under the commerce power.3 4  The latter was the test of the
older cases.
This case also marks the end of the application of different
ideologies to labor cases as distinguished from industrial cases-5
arising under the Sherman Act because the "market control" test,
in effect if not in words, has been consistently applied in the latter
casesY6
In Milk Wagon Drivers' Union v. Lake Valley F. Prod.,37
decided shortly after the Apex Case, the supreme court held that
since the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the federal courts have no juris-
33See (1940) 54 Harv. L. Rev. 146; but see Brown, The Apex Case and
Its Effect Upon Labor Activities and the Anti-Trust Laws, (1941) 21
Boston U. L. Rev. 48, 94-95.
31See Cavers, Labor v. The Sherman Act, (1941) 8 U. Chi. L. Rev.
246, 250; (1941) 39 Mich. L. Rev. 462, 463; cf. Brown, The Apex Case
Pnd Its Effect Upon Labor Activities and the Anti-Trust Laws, (1941) 21
Boston U. L. Rev. 48, 90.
3X3Standard Oil Co. v. United States, (1911) 221 U. S. 1, 31 Sup. Ct.
502, 55 L. Ed. 619, 34 L. R. A. (N.S.) 834, Ann. Cas. 1912D 734; Standard
Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, (1912) 226 U. S. 20, 33 Sup. Ct. 9, 57
L. Ed. 107; United States v. American Tobacco Co., (1911) 221 U. S. 106,
31 Sup. Ct. 632, 55 L. Ed. 663.
31See Brown, The Apex Case and Its Effect Upon Labor Activities
and the Anti-Trust Laws, (1941) 21 Boston U. L. Rev. 48, 95; Landis, The
Apex Case, (1941) 26 Corn. L. Q. 191, 208; (1940) 35 Ill. L. Rev. 424.
37(1940) 61 Sup. Ct. 122, discussed in (1941) 25 MINNESOTA LAW
REviEW 534; (1941) 26 Corn. L. Q. 328; (1941) 39 Mich. L. Rev. 653;
(1941) 26 Iowa L. Rev. 411; (1941) 29 Geo. L. 3. 658; (1941) 21 Boston
U. L. Rev. 171.
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dict.on to grant injunctions in cases growing out of a labor dispute
merely because there is an alleged violation of the Sherman Act.
The restricted scope of the remedy of injunction under the
Norris-LaGuardia Act had led to predictions of the increased em-
ployment of criminal prosecution under the Sherman Act in labor
disputes cases.-8 But this weapon against labor was virtually
destroyed by the recent decision in United States v. Hutchesoni.'
Here the defendant carpenters' union was engaged in a juris-
dictional dispute with the machinists over certain jobs at the plant
of Anheuser-Busch, which obtained materials for its manufactur-
ing from, and sold its finished pioduct largely into, interstate
commerce. Because of the dispute, the carpenters called a strike
against Anheuser-Busch, picketed it and its tenant, and requested
that union members and their friends refrain from buying
Anheuser-Busch beer. It was held, Mr. Justice Frankfurter writ-
ing the opinion, that an order sustaining a demurrer to the indict-
ment under the Sherman Act be sustained. The reasoning used
was that since the passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the
Clayton Act must be read in the light of the Congressional policy
toward labor expressed by the enactment of the former, and, in
this light, the acts enumerated in sec. 20 of the latter must be
taken to be lawful. The acts alleged come within sec. 20, are
therefore lawful, and hence do not support the indictment.
The technique of statutory construction employed by Mr. Jus-
tice Frankfurter in this case has been criticized on the ground that
a more forthright method of achieving the same result would be
to have held that the Clayton Act had been previously misinter-
preted by the courts. 40 But, as pointed out by Dean Landis,41
the method used does save the court from the criticism that it is
busily engaged in overruling cases decided before the recent
changes in its membership. However, Dean Landis also contends
that the validity of the process employed by Mr. Justice Frank-
furter must be determined by the correctness of his interpretation
of the Congressional policy expressed in the Norris-LaGuardia
Act, and concludes that it would seem that the intent of Congress
38Feidler, Labor Law-The Norris-LaGuardia Act, (1936) 11 Wis.
L. Rev. 552, 562; Arnold, Fair and Effective Use of Present Anti-
trust Procedure, (1938) 47 Yale L. J. 1294, 1299.
39(1941) 61 Sup. Ct. 463.
40(1941) 54 Harv. L. Rev. 887, 888.
41Landis, The Apex Case, (1941) 26 Corn. L. Q. 191, 212B.
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was to affect procedure only,42 and that the Norris-LaGuardia Act
was to supplant, not supplement, the Clayton Act. It may be true
that Congress, thinking it had only the power to affect procedure,
intended that the act be confined to procedural changes. Never-
theless, a broader policy of legalizing certain of labor's activities
may have been manifested by Congress even though it was not
carried into execution by the provisions as enacted.
IV. CONCLUSION
What is the combined effect of the Apex and Hutcheson Cases?
It is probable that the "market control" test will be applied by the
court in those cases where the conduct involved does not come
within the terms of sec. 20 of the Clayton Act. Thus, even if the
acts alleged are not within the scope of sec. 20, they will not
violate the antitrust laws unless, in purpose or effect, they result
in the market control of a commodity by monopolizing the supply,
controlling its price, or discriminating between would-be pur-
chasers. Thus it would seem that the net result is that the anti-
trust acts are no longer applicable to labor in so far as its normal
activities are concerned and that its conduct comes within their
interdict only in the unusual situations of the type represented by
United States v. Brims, where labor combined with industrialists
to keep non-union products out of the market.
42This idea was expressed even by Frankfurter, who was one of the
drafters of the Act, in Frankfurter and Greene, Congressional Power Over
the Labor Injunction, (1931) 31 Col. L. Rev. 385, 408.
43(1926) 272 U. S. 549, 47 Sup. Ct. 169, 71 L. Ed. 403.
